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ABSTRACT
JAMES D. OMARTIAN: Do Banks Aid and Abet Asset Concealment: Evidence from the
Panama Papers.
(Under the direction of Eva Labro)
Using new data from the Panama Papers, I find investors and banks undermine regulation
clamping down on foreign tax evasion by establishing opaque legal structures in tax havens. How-
ever, this concealment strategy is only effective when investors view their offshore bank as a reli-
able evasion partner. When they believe offshore banks will violate their trust and cooperate with
the tax authorities, investors make fewer incorporations and increase closures of offshore entities.
My study provides a rare direct look at investors’ and banks’ actions taken to increase opacity and
informs debate on international cooperation to combat offshore tax evasion.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cash-strapped governments have been vocal about the problem of offshore tax evasion. For
example, a 2008 US Senate staff report estimates that “offshore tax abuses” result in an annual loss
to the US Treasury of $100 billion in tax revenue (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations 2008). While the size of this estimate is in dispute, most agree that the true loss is
quite large, and that the US is not the only country to lose revenue. However, despite the economic
importance, academic research has struggled to advance our understanding of the shadowy dy-
namics of the offshore financial industry. This dearth of evidence is particularly problematic given
the cost and reach of regulatory reforms enacted to target offshore evasion. By its very nature, tax
evasion is a secretive activity, and data availability is the chief obstacle to empirical research in the
area. However, the recent “Panama Papers” leak, detailing over 200,000 offshore entities created
by the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, provides a fresh opportunity to observe investors
interacting with the offshore financial industry. Using these new data and exploiting a series of
regulatory reforms as quasi-natural experiments, this paper explores the influence of financial in-
stitutions on investors’ efforts to conceal offshore financial activity from tax authorities.
The seminal theoretical paper on tax evasion, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) characterizes tax
evasion as a gamble against possible detection by the tax authority. This model is an extension of
the Becker (1968) economic model of crime—investors will under-report income if the expected
benefits of evasion (lower tax) outweigh the expected cost (probability-adjusted penalty for getting
caught). However, because many assets (e.g. securities, real estate, bank accounts) have a recorded
owner, tax authorities can fairly readily track down egregiously underreported income. Cremer and
Gahvari (1994) introduces the concept of “concealment technology,” where for a cost, investors
can reduce the probability of detection. My paper focuses on the use of one type of concealment
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technology: offshore entities.
The strategy works as follows. An investor contracts with a service provider like Mossack Fon-
seca to incorporate a legal entity, and interposes the entity between him- or herself and the assets,
creating an ownership chain. Provided the entity is incorporated in an offshore financial center
jurisdiction, this chain can be particularly opaque. These jurisdictions—often called tax havens
because they impose few to no taxes—generally do not require disclosure of shareholder iden-
tities, making the asset’s ultimate economic owner virtually undetectable to an outside observer.
While the use of an offshore entity is legal, failing to report income earned by the offshore entity
to the investor’s home country typically constitutes evasion.
As a concealment technology, offshore entities do have a weak point—to be of any use they
typically need a bank account. Banks are required to conduct due diligence on the source of funds
to make sure the account is not used for money laundering or sponsoring terrorist activity. As a
result, even though an account may held in the entity’s name, the financial institution will often
know the identity of the beneficial owner, and so the probability of detection depends on the bank
not sharing this identity information with the tax authorities. When making their evasion and
concealment decisions, investors must factor in their expectations that the bank will maintain this
secret going forward.
Maintaining secrecy and facilitating evasion provides the banks with a revenue stream, but
organizations like the OECD and European Union have begun to apply pressure on banks to coop-
erate with the international tax authorities. This pressure prompts investors to downwardly revise
their beliefs about the bank’s willingness to protect the investor’s identity going forward. Assum-
ing the offshore banking business is competitive, pressured banks will need to compensate their
depositors for the added risk of detection. I test for this effect empirically using the EU Savings
Directive (EUSD) as a source of pressure.
Under the EUSD, banks must cooperate with the tax authorities in other EU member states
by either exchanging account information or withholding tax on interest income that the account
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holder can recoup through self-disclosure. However, a significant loophole exists: corporate ac-
counts are not subject to the EUSD’s information exchange and withholding tax provisions. Thus,
using an offshore entity is an ideal method to defang this additional risk. After showing in the data
that the EUSD prompts affected investors to incorporate offshore entities, I test for a bank response.
I predict and find that to lower the investors’ risk of detection and to stave off loss of market share
to banks not covered by the EUSD, EUSD-area banks push investors into using offshore entities.
So long as the pressure on the bank is sufficiently low (e.g. there is minimal risk of government
reprisals), the revenue stream from the offshore business can serve as a bonding mechanism, cred-
ibly communicating the bank’s commitment to maintaining secrecy (Konrad and Stolper 2016).
However, competition in the offshore banking industry limits the available rents, prompting the
bonding mechanism to break down under sufficiently strong pressure.1 Thus, I predict when the
pressure on banks is high, investors no longer trust the bank will keep their identity secret, prompt-
ing the abandonment of offshore entities as concealment.
I test this hypothesis using three settings. First, I exploit a revision to the EUSD which broad-
ened the EUSD’s scope beyond individual accounts and required banks to identify and report EU
beneficial owners of corporate accounts. Unlike the first iteration of the EUSD where banks could
resist cooperation with the tax authorities by taking advantage of a weakness in the law, to continue
shielding the investor’s identity under the new rule EU-area banks would need to directly violate
the law. I predict that EU investors anticipate that under the stronger law, banks will not be able
to withstand the pressure to cooperate with the tax authorities, and as a result, the investors close
their offshore entities. Second, I look at the effect of the US’s Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (FATCA). I expect FATCA, which requires foreign financial institutions to comb through ac-
counts for potential US investor ownership, depresses the effectiveness of offshore entities as a
concealment technology. As a result, I predict that US investors create fewer offshore entities in
1Key to this explanation is that pressure is applied to some, but not all banks, resulting in a subset of banks able to
maintain secrecy at lower cost. Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) notes that in sequentially forcing providers out of the
offshore business, the remaining participants face lower competition and earn higher profits, making it harder to drive
them out of business. As a result, a piecemeal approach can be more expensive than a coordinated worldwide attack
and potentially counterproductive.
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response. Third, I predict that when Swiss banking secrecy is undermined, investors that use Swiss
bank accounts as part of their offshore concealment schemes are more likely to close down their
entities.
There are a few reasons why my predictions may not hold. First, the use of offshore entities
for nefarious purposes may be limited and investors may simply have nothing to hide from their
home governments. If that is the case, investors may derive no tax benefits from them, and hence
disclosure may have minimal effect. Second, I hypothesize investors modify their behavior in
response to changes in their beliefs about banks’ willingness to cooperate; investors may believe
the regulatory changes will have no bite on banks. Lastly, given the sheer quantity of information
to be exchanged and complexity of the international banking industry, governments, especially
smaller, less-developed ones, may be ill-equipped to make meaningful use of their new information
channels, resulting in no appreciable increase in the probability of detection and hence no increase
in the expected costs of evasion.
I find that investors in affected countries increase the number of offshore entity incorpora-
tions by 73% just prior to the roll-out of the EUSD. Furthermore, I find that this activity is not
just investor-driven; banks actively coordinate the creation of entities on behalf of their clients
with a 3-1/2 fold increase in the rate of entity incorporations driven by banks. Once the EUSD
is strengthened, investors curtail their use of offshore entities; entities created specifically to cir-
cumvent disclosure to the government are two to five times more likely to close than benchmark
entities after the draft amendment was issued strengthening the EUSD. Along the same vein, I find
that FATCA results in a roughly 30% reduction in incorporation activity US investors. I also find
that the closure rates for entities that likely use Swiss bank accounts increase by 33% and 49% in
response to the UBS deferred prosecution agreement and the introduction of the US Department
of Justice’s Swiss bank program respectively. Together, these empirical results suggest that ex-
pectations of bank behavior heavily influence investors’ use of offshore entities as a concealment
technology.
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A threat to the validity of my inferences is that given the incorporations in the Panama Pa-
pers were all executed by Mossack Fonseca, the data may not representative of the industry as
a whole. To rule out this possibility, I repeat variants of my tests using another recent leak of
offshore entities: the Bahamas Leaks. This dataset contains all entities—regardless of the ser-
vice provider—created in the Bahamas. Adapting some of my tests to this new dataset, I observe
consistent results, suggesting that my findings are not limited to Mossack Fonseca.
My study contributes on a number of fronts. First, I bring new data to bear on the question of
offshore tax evasion. Zucman (2013) estimates that 8% of worldwide household wealth is held in
tax havens. Despite this massive accumulation, our understanding of how investors interact with
the offshore industry is thin. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) notes that tax planning strategies fall on
a continuum of legality—benign, clearly legal actions like the use of municipal bonds on one end
to illegal actions such as evasion and non-compliance on the other—and argues that the aggressive
end of the spectrum is most interesting to academics and policymakers. However, data availability
is a major obstacle to making progress in this area. What prevents detection from tax authorities
also typically makes evasion unobservable to the researcher. The Panama Papers offers a unique
opportunity to view the decisions to form and dissolve offshore entities at the individual investor
level, providing a rare glimpse into actions taken primarily for anonymity reasons. I employ these
data to detect “traces of non-compliance” (Slemrod and Weber 2012), similar in spirit to Hanlon,
Maydew, and Thornock (2015). Other studies in finance have used leaked confidential datasets
to observe questionable activity (Mironov 2013; Griffin, Kruger, and Maturana 2016; Grieser,
Kapadia, Li, and Simonov 2016).2 To the best of my knowledge, my study provides the first
academic look at the Panama Papers entity data.3
Second, my paper brings to the fore the role banks play in facilitating or fighting offshore tax
2In 2013, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists released a much smaller leak of offshore entity data
from different entity providers. To the best of my knowledge, Caruana-Galizia and Caruana-Galizia (2016) is the
only study to explore this precursor dataset. Given its coverage period only covers one of the regulatory changes I
explore, this dataset is ill-suited to my study.
3In concurrent work, O’Donovan, Wagner, and Zeume (2016) links 397 Orbis firms to the Panama Papers files to
determine the price effects of the data release. That study finds that firms with connections to the Panama Papers
experience negative returns concurrent with the release.
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evasion. The regulations I explore conscript financial institutions into policing investors on behalf
of the tax authorities. However, banks have strong business incentives to provide lax monitoring
on this front (Picard and Pieretti 2011). Thus, it is unclear how banks will respond. On the
heels of the financial meltdown, there is a growing interest in the culture of dishonesty in banks
(e.g. Cohn, Fehr, and Mare´chal (2014)). While other streams of research in finance explore the
complicity of financial institutions in other illegal behaviors such as mortgage fraud (Piskorski,
Seru, and Witkin 2015; Griffin and Maturana 2016), little empirical evidence exists documenting
the extent to which financial institutions help or hinder tax evasion. Chernykh and Mityakov (2017)
is an exception, which using leaked data from the Russian Central bank, finds that Russian banks
with heavy transactional flows to offshore financial centers are more likely to have employees and
client firms that evade taxes. Gallemore, Gipper, and Maydew (2016) looks at the role of banks in
corporate tax planning, but it studies tax planning in general—not offshore evasion.
Third, my findings inform the debate on regulatory efforts to control offshore tax evasion. The
regulatory changes I explore are non-trivial, and hence an ex-post evaluation of their outcomes
is important in weighing the costs and benefits. For example, in 2014, Canada’s top five banks
estimated they had spent nearly $700 million in initial costs to comply with FATCA, despite the
fact that FATCA is a US law (Trichur 2014). There has been some work evaluating the the EUSD
(Johannesen 2014; Klautke and Weichenrieder 2010; Hemmelgarn and Nicode`me 2009), but those
papers look at the initial implementation alone and do not explore bank reactions. To the best of my
knowledge, no study has documented the joint bank and investor reactions to the amended EUSD
or the US clamp down on Swiss banks. One concurrent study explores FATCA, inferring effects
from changes in Foreign Direct Investment in US securities (De Simone, Lester, and Markle 2017).
Fourth, while the setting is tax, my study contributes to the disclosure literature. Leuz and
Wysocki (2016) notes the importance of mandated disclosure for shaping behaviors, and calls for
additional research on the incentive role of disclosure regulation, particularly outside of a capital
markets setting. The regulatory changes I explore do not change the legality of the investor ac-
tivity. Rather, they seek to discourage tax evasion through increased disclosures from financial
6
institutions.4
4While combating tax evasion is their express purpose, the regulations I explore may have spillover effects to curbing
other unsavory activity. In my setting, I am unable to distinguish if investors shun disclosure to the government to
conceal tax evasion in particular or some other illicit behavior.
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
For corporations, most countries impose a territorial taxation system such that only local in-
come is subject to tax in the home country. Thus, for companies in territorial countries, shifting
income to low tax jurisdictions—either through locating real activities there or moving profits
on paper—can reduce tax expense. The US is one of the few remaining countries that have a
worldwide taxation system, which taxes US corporations’ income regardless of where it is earned.
However, shifting income to low tax jurisdictions does allow US corporations to defer their tax ex-
pense until they repatriate the profits to the US, potentially creating savings if the US implements
a repatriation tax holiday. Tax havens provide corporations with a low- or no-tax jurisdiction to
locate some of their profits.
International taxation for individuals operates differently. Most countries tax residents on their
worldwide income and do not allow for deferral.1 As a result, simply shifting income to a low-
or no-tax foreign jurisdiction does not provide de jure income tax relief. However, tax havens can
be very useful for investors that wish to under-report income to their home country’s tax authority.
One method is for investors to relocate assets to low- or no-tax jurisdictions and earn profits on
their investment there. So long as information about the investment does not get reported back to
the investor’s home country tax authority, the investor can evade taxation at home.
A related way that tax havens allow individuals to under-report their income is through dis-
guising asset ownership. A number of tax haven jurisdictions let foreign investors create legal en-
tities2—sometimes called “shell corporations” or more pejoratively “sham corporations”—catered
1The United States is an exception, taxing all US residents and all US citizens regardless of domicile. Thus, retiring
to a tax haven does not eliminate US tax liability for wealthy American investors unless they renounce their US
citizenship.
2Depending on the jurisdiction, these entities can be corporations, partnerships, foundations, and trusts. While each
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to investing anonymously. These offshore entities have minimal legal restrictions. Typically no
more than one shareholder is required, and if maintained, share registers are kept with the entity’s
registered agent (e.g. Mossack Fonseca) and not disclosed to the government. Paperwork require-
ments are also designed with opacity in mind. Annual reports are typically not required, and enti-
ties generally do not file tax returns in their incorporation jurisdiction. There are no requirements
that economic activity happens in the offshore jurisdiction, and in fact many jurisdictions require it
to occur outside their borders to receive tax-free treatment. Typically, the only requirement is that
the registered agent has an office in the jurisdiction.
As the beneficial owner of an offshore entity, an investor can conduct anonymous investment
activity worldwide—even in the investor’s home country—using the offshore entity’s name. This
anonymity in and of itself is not illegal and can have value for the investor for a myriad of reasons.
For investors residing in countries with weak property rights, using an offshore entity may prevent
government expropriation. Investors buying property or acquiring a firm may want to conceal their
identity from the counterparty for an edge in negotiations. Assets in the entity’s name are harder to
discover through the legal process, potentially shielding them from seizure in litigation. Of course,
the anonymity also allows investors to simply not report taxable income that was earned by the
offshore entity. While the use of an entity is legal, for most investor countries failing to report an
offshore entity’s income to the investor’s home country constitutes illegal evasion.3
of these have different requirements and structures, the Panama Papers data do not distinguish among them. Given
this data limitation, and since these entities can be used to serve similar purposes, I also make no distinction between
them in this study and for expositional ease refer to them collectively as offshore entities. Pooling these entity types
may add noise to my tests and likely biases against finding results.
3Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules, which are widely prevalent, essentially treat foreign income from shell
companies as if it were domestic income.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA
3.1 Mossack Fonseca and the Leak
Mossack Fonseca resulted from the 1986 merger of two Panamanian law firms run by Ju¨rgen
Mossack and Ramo´n Fonseca. The practice has since grown to over 500 employees with offices in
every continent. The firm provides a broad array of services designed to set up and manage legal
entities such as corporations, trusts, and foundations in tax haven jurisdictions. For the majority of
entities created, Mossack Fonseca works with intermediaries rather than the clients directly. These
intermediaries, such as other law firms, banks, financial institutions, and accountants, advise the
client and conduct much of the administration involved with operating an offshore entity, with
Mossack Fonseca’s role limited to incorporating the entity and maintaining its registration with the
relevant authority. In other cases Mossack Fonseca provides full service directly to clients.
In early 2015, an anonymous source began leaking what would become 11.5 million Mossack
Fonseca internal files to the German newspaper Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung. Faced with the sheer size
of the leak and the challenges making sense of this data, Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung turned to the Inter-
national Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) to process the 2.6 terabytes worth of data,
much of which was contained in image-based files. After a year of data processing and investiga-
tive work, ICIJ member newspapers began publishing investigative articles on April 3, 2016.
The leak contains records dating back to the 1970s documenting the creation of over 200,000
offshore entities. The data implicate over 140 politicians and public officials in schemes to hide
assets overseas, including associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the brother-in-law of
Chinese President Xi Jinping, the family of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and UK Prime
Minister David Cameron’s father. Under immense pressure, Prime Minister of Iceland Sigmundur
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David Gunnlaugsson resigned when the Panama Papers revealed his holdings of an offshore com-
pany that held Icelandic bank debt during the country’s banking crisis. Politicians are not the only
names mentioned in the leak; FIFA officials, professional athletes, and actors featured prominently.
3.2 Organization of the Data
The data leaked to Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung include details like bank account information and client
communication records. However, ICIJ has not publicly released data beyond the entity database.
The database released1 consists of three main data files: one for entities, one for officers, and one
for intermediaries. In the entity file, each record corresponds with an offshore entity created by
Mossack Fonseca. Included in these entity records are the entity’s name, incorporation date, and
a legal jurisdiction (incorporation country). The officer file consists of a list of persons (natural
and legal) that have a stake in an entity along with a country and in many cases an address. Each
record in the intermediary file contains the name, address, and country of a firm that interfaces
with the ultimate investor.2 The data do not categorize officers (e.g. person, company, etc.) or
intermediaries (e.g. bank, law firm, etc.), but this information is often apparent from the names.
Thus, when necessary I classify officers and intermediaries using text filters. The power of the
Panama Papers data is the connections the database makes between the three files.
Consider the following hypothetical example. Assume in February 2005 “Joe Bloggs,” a UK
resident approaches “Omega Investment Services” a Luxembourg wealth management firm for
help managing his portfolio and perhaps reducing his UK tax exposure. Together they decide it
would be advantageous to deposit funds in “Lambda Bank” in Luxembourg.3 Because the UK
government has no authority over Lambda, the bank does not share Joe’s account information with
HM Customs, the UK tax authority. So long as Joe does not self-report, HM Customs has little
ability to tax profits on this portfolio. However, to further conceal his wealth, Joe and Omega
1Available on the ICIJ website at https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/pages/database
2Entities also frequently have a physical address listed, but this address is typically the same as the linked intermediary
and not the location of real economic activity.
3For ease of exposition I describe the portfolio as a simple cash bank account. In actuality, the portfolio likely contains
securities and other financial instruments. In such a case, the Luxembourg bank would act as a fiduciary—maintaining
custody of the assets while Joe remains the beneficial owner. Such a relationship is analogous to a brokerage account.
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decide to create an offshore entity called Alpha Enterprises—a company that is solely owned by
Joe but conducts no real economic activity. Joe can transfer title of his assets to Alpha while
maintaining beneficial control, and have Alpha in turn deposit the assets with Lambda. Omega
Investment Services contracts with Mossack Fonseca to create Alpha Enterprises in the British
Virgin Islands (BVI) on behalf of Joe.
Now assume in April 2006, Joe and his American business partner “Jane Doe” again approach
Omega Investment Services for help managing their partnership’s assets. They decide to create an
entity called “Beta Inc.” with Joe and Jane each as shareholders. Omega again turns to Mossack
Fonseca for incorporation services, but this time they incorporate Beta in Anguilla. Joe and Jane
transfer title of their partnerships assets to Beta and have Beta open up an account with “Mu Bank,”
also in Luxembourg, to deposit the assets.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how these structures would appear in the data. The black-and-white
portions appear in the data, whereas the gray elements are not captured. I observe both Joe and
Jane, their respective countries, and their “shareholder of” relationships with Alpha and Beta. I can
see the incorporation dates (and closing dates if applicable) for Alpha and Beta along with their
jurisdictions (BVI and Anguilla). I also observe the involvement of Omega Investment Services as
an intermediary in the creation of both Alpha and Beta. The data do not however contain the bank
information.
My hypotheses concern the offshore incorporation activity driven by investors in particular
countries. As in my hypothetical example, one entity can have multiple investors, sometimes
spanning multiple countries. As a result, for most of my tests I cannot use the entities themselves
as the unit of analysis. Thus, my measure of incorporation activity is the count of new investor-
entity pairs created in a given month. For the example in Figure 3.1, I would count three pairs.
The first would be a UK-BVI pair created in February 2005. The second and third would be a
UK-Anguilla and a US-Anguilla pair each created in April 2006. For ease of exposition, I refer to
the creation of these pairs as incorporations.
12
Figure 3.1: Example of the Panama Papers data structure. This figure depicts two hypothetical
investors and two hypothetical entities—one which is held by a single investor and one held by both investors—along
with the intermediary that worked with Mossack Fonseca to set up the entities. I consider the creation of the three
“shareholder of” links as three “incorporations.” The data do not capture the grayed out elements (financial institutions
when the financial institution is distinct from the intermediary).
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 lists the number of entities in the sample, broken down by the number of investors.
The “All Investors” columns present entities by number of linked shareholders in the entire Panama
Papers database. Most entities have a only a handful of investors. In many instances the share-
holders themselves are from a tax haven country; in these cases the listed shareholder is typically
not the beneficial owner and the entity may be part of a multilayer structure. Additionally, the
investor’s country is often not populated. Typically, this occurs because the entity is set up with
bearer shares. Bearer share entities are owned by whoever holds the physical stock certificate;
no official share register is maintained. In the data, bearer shares appear with the investor having
the name “The Bearer” or similar and no country information. In the “Non-Haven, Non-Missing
Country Investors” columns I exclude shareholder links where the shareholder’s country is a haven
per Gravelle (2009) or missing, as these links don’t provide investor location information. Exclud-
ing these links results in 79,037 entities with no shareholders with valid country information.
Table 3.1: Multiple investor entities. This table lists the frequency of entitis with various numbers of share-
holder investors. The “All Investors” columns consider all of the investor-entity links in the Panama Papers Data.
The “Non-Haven, Non-Missing Country Investors” columns consider investor links where the investor’s country is
populated and not a tax haven country per Gravelle (2009). Missing investor country information typically denotes an
entity with bearer shares.
All Investors Non-Haven, Non-Missing Country Investors
Investors Entities Percent Cumulative Entities Percent Cumulative
per Entity Percent Percent
0 0 0.0 0.0 79 036 65.6 65.6
1 55 765 46.3 46.3 28 090 23.3 88.9
2 33 038 27.4 73.7 8166 6.8 95.7
3 11 805 9.8 83.5 2488 2.1 97.8
4 11 709 9.7 93.2 1231 1.0 98.8
5 3290 2.7 96.0 577 0.5 99.3
6 1742 1.4 97.4 289 0.2 99.5
7 894 0.7 98.1 158 0.1 99.6
8 520 0.4 98.6 104 0.1 99.7
9 285 0.2 98.8 62 0.1 99.8
10 367 0.3 99.1 41 0.0 99.8
Panel A of Table 3.2 breaks down incorporation activity since 2000 by investor country. While
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the OECD has been leading the charge in combating offshore tax evasion, many non-OECD coun-
tries rank highly. Panel A also lists the percentage of shareholders by country that are individual
people. To determine if the shareholder is a natural person or another entity, I apply a text filter
on the name to search for a list of company terms (e.g. “Inc.”, “S.A.”, etc.) based on the name
standardization algorithms used by the NBER patent project.4 While there is some heterogeneity
from country to country, the majority of shareholders in the data appear to be individual investors.
Offshore jurisdictions are quick to point out there are many legitimate reasons for investors
to use an offshore entity aside from tax avoidance. For instance, tax haven jurisdictions typically
have strong governance and legal institutions (Dharmapala and Hines 2009), potentially offering a
more stable or less restrictive environment in which to conduct business than some investors’ home
countries. Also, investors may be shielding their identities for reasons unrelated to taxes—holding
assets in a legal name may help companies shield expansion plans and property acquisitions from
the prying eyes of competitors. On the flip side, doing so can also facilitate expropriation and
tunneling (Chernykh 2008). Looking at the data in Table 3.2, Panel A, it appears that tax evasion
is not the only reason for setting up an offshore entity. For instance, the United Arab Emirates
imposes no tax on individual income and hence UAE investors would not derive a tax benefit from
their use. However, the country ranks sixth in terms of incorporation activity, suggesting that in
all likelihood, UAE investors are using offshore entities for reasons unrelated to investor-level tax
evasion.
Because little real economic activity takes place in the entity’s jurisdiction location, investors
face a choice in where to incorporate. Panel B of Table 3.2 list incorporation activity by jurisdic-
tion. I tabulate activity for all incorporations and incorporations where the investor is known to
be located in a non-haven country. For Mossack Fonseca’s entities, the most common jurisdiction
is the British Virgin Islands, but sizable incorporation activity occurs in 5 additional jurisdictions:
4I base my filters on Jim Bessen’s adaptation of the Derwent Standardization, which can be downloaded at https://
sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/posts/namestandardizationroutinesuploaded. If any of the standardized
terms are found in the name, I categorize the officer as a non-person.
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Table 3.2: Country descriptive statistics. Panel A lists the most active investor countries (excluding investors
located in haven countries per Gravelle (2009)) by incorporations since 2000. The “Percent Individual” columns
denote the percentage of that country’s incorporations where the investor name does not have a company word in it
using the name standardization process used in the NBER patent data project. Panel B breaks down incorporation
activity by offshore jurisdiction since 2000 for all investors and non-haven, non-missing country investors.
Panel A: Incorporation activity by investor country
Percent Percent
Country Incorporations Individual Country Incorporations Individual
China 23 438 98 Guatemala 420 88
United Kingdom 4604 75 Ukraine 397 98
Taiwan 3537 92 India 390 94
United States 3494 84 Japan 356 95
Russia 3368 98 New Zealand 352 40
United Arab Emirates 3093 83 Philippines 348 93
South Africa 2010 97 Greece 307 100
Uruguay 1816 88 Egypt 287 96
Brazil 1707 92 Zimbabwe 282 84
Malaysia 1514 90 Belgium 269 98
Peru 1469 99 Haiti 265 71
Australia 1182 80 Germany 260 90
Indonesia 1023 99 Netherlands 245 72
Colombia 1007 92 Dominican Republic 212 82
Italy 958 98 Mexico 212 97
Argentina 932 97 Czech Republic 210 98
Israel 829 94 Iceland 205 99
France 812 98 Pakistan 197 100
Ecuador 795 96 Nigeria 182 91
Canada 790 83 South Korea 171 94
Thailand 781 91 Kenya 170 95
Spain 689 95 Portugal 168 77
Saudi Arabia 671 72 Hungary 154 100
Venezuela 613 99 Chile 146 94
Turkey 536 98 Kazakhstan 142 97
Panel B: Incorporation activity by offshore jurisdiction
Non-Haven, Non-Missing
All Investors Country Investors Bearer
Offshore Jurisdiction Incorporations Cumulative % Incorporations Cumulative % Shares
British Virgin Islands 154 213 57.0 44 348 67.3 19 195
Panama 56 744 77.9 2298 70.8 44 288
Seychelles 23 841 86.7 9672 85.4 10 502
Bahamas 13 662 91.8 2312 88.9 1878
Samoa 12 289 96.3 4113 95.2 2188
Anguilla 3624 97.7 2391 98.8 40
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Panama, Seychelles, Samoa, the Bahamas, and Anguilla. The data suggest that certain jurisdic-
tions may be optimized for specific structures. For example, Panama dominates the bearer share
incorporation activity.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Individual Account Information Exchange: EUSD
Taxpayers are more likely to evade taxes when income is self-reported (Kleven, Knudsen,
Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez 2011). However, when a third party reports income information to
the tax authority, taxpayers have far less opportunity to avoid detection of underreported income.
To target the estimated $2 trillion in European wealth hidden in tax havens where it has influence
(Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman 2017), the European Union in June 2003 enacted the EU
Savings Directive (EUSD). The EUSD requires banks in participating states1 to identify individ-
ual (non-corporate) accounts held by EU residents and report account information to the account
holder’s home country. States with strong bank secrecy regimes—the jurisdictions standing to lose
the most with successful third-party bank reporting across country lines—understandably objected,
so the EU allowed for an alternate compliance method. Instead of exchanging account informa-
tion, participating states can opt to withhold a tax on interest income for account holders residing
in an EUSD country.2 To avoid the withholding tax, on an individual basis depositors could elect
to report their identity and interest income information to their home country’s tax authority.
I explore two responses to the EUSD: investor response and bank response. I predict and
1In addition to the EU member states, the EUSD applied to Andorra, Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cay-
man Islands, Curac¸ao, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montserrat, San Marino, St Maarten,
Switzerland, and the Turks and Caicos. The EUSD took effect on July 1, 2005 except in Bulgaria and Romania where
the effective date was January 1, 2007.
2EU member states Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg opted to apply a withholding tax, along with Andorra, Liecht-
enstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and
Caicos, Curac¸ao and St Maarten. The remaining EU member states along with Anguilla, Aruba, the Cayman Islands,
and Montserrat opted for bank disclosure. Beginning in 2005, the withholding rate was 15%, which increased to
20% in 2008 and 35% in 2011. As a compliance incentive, the jurisdiction where the account was located shares the
proceeds of the tax: 75% flows to the depositor’s home country and 25% stays with the jurisdiction where the account
is located. Although the investor’s home country receives proceeds from the tax, no information identifying account
holders accompanies the funds.
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find that EU investors increase their use of offshore entities to circumvent the information sharing
and withholding tax provisions of the EUSD. I also predict and find that EUSD-area banks in
jurisdictions with strong bank secrecy laws respond to the EUSD by actively orchestrating the
creation of offshore entities for their customers’ benefit.
4.1.1 Investor Response
The EUSD has a number loopholes that motivated investors can employ to avoid its provi-
sions.3 Pertinent to my study, investors can shift the account to being held by a corporate entity.
By creating a legal entity (anywhere in the world) and deposit funds in the legal entity’s name, the
investor can circumvent the disclosure or withholding tax provisions (Commission of the European
Communities 2008). Because of their flexibility, secrecy, and lack of income taxation, offshore en-
tities are aptly suited for this concealment purpose. Employing country-level bilateral deposit data
from the Bank of International Settlements, Johannesen (2014) finds concurrent with the EUSD a
reduction in Swiss bank deposits from EU depositors and a corresponding increase in Swiss bank
deposits from Panamanian depositors. This evidence is consistent with investors transferring title
of deposits to offshore entities in Panama and keeping the funds in Switzerland.
I use investor response to the EUSD to validate my measure of offshore incorporation activity
against prior research. I predict that in the months leading up to the July 1, 2005 EUSD effective
date, investors in countries facing the automatic reporting of interest income or withholding tax
take steps to protect themselves and scramble to incorporate offshore entities. Once the roll-out
occurs, I predict the flurry of activity subsides, but that the level of incorporation activity after
the effective date remains somewhat higher than before the EUSD run-up. While the pre-July 1
activity likely reflects steps taken to protect existing deposits, a post-July 1 increase likely accounts
3Both the disclosure and any withholding tax apply only to individual interest income. As a result, investors can shift
to non-interest-based investments or change holdings to grandfathered assets that were not subject to the directive’s
provisions. However, prior research finds that investors do not pursue these methods. Klautke and Weichenrieder
(2010) finds no increase in the demand for grandfathered assets, and Hemmelgarn and Nicode`me (2009) does not
observe a shift away from interest-bearing assets.
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for effort shielding new foreign deposits. I employ the following model:
Incorporations it = α1MarJul2005EU it + α2PostJul2005EU it + βi + γt + εit (4.1)
where i indexes investor country and t indexes the month and year. MarJul2005EU it takes a
value of 1 if country i is subject to the EUSD4 and t = March, April, May, June, or July 2005,
and 0 otherwise. I include the first month of the EUSD effective period (July 2005) to account for
stragglers, or if there is measurement error in the incorporation date. PostJul2005EU it takes a
value of 1 if i is subject to the EUSD and t is August 2005 or later. βi is a country fixed effect and
γt is a month-year fixed effect. εit is an error term. Because the distribution of incorporations is
highly skewed, I estimate Equation (4.1) using two operationalizations of Incorporations it. I use
an indicator variable equaling 1 if investors from country i incorporated any new entities in month
t, and 0 otherwise. I also employ a logarithmic transformation where I take the natural log of one
plus the number of new incorporations from the country i in month t. I employ OLS to avoid
the incidental variables problem inherent with estimating non-linear models using fixed effects. I
cluster the standard errors by country-jurisdiction pairs and month.
If incorporation activity increases in anticipation of the EUSD effective date, α1 should be
positive. I estimate the model using investor country-month observations of incorporation activity
from 2002 through 2007. Table 4.1 presents the results. As predicted, the estimates in Columns
(1) and (2) suggest an increase in incorporation activity from EUSD investor countries. I observe
an increase of 20 percentage points in the probability of there being offshore incorporation activity
from an EUSD country in the months prior to the EUSD taking effect. Similarly, I observe a
roughly 73% increase in the quantity of incorporations (e0.551 = 1.73). Once the EUSD comes
into force, the incorporation activity indeed subsides relative to the pre-July 1 rush, but remains
higher than the early period.
4Consistent with Johannesen (2014), I consider treated only those countries that were EU members prior to the 2004
EU enlargement. New accessions undergo structural changes that may confound my estimation of the EUSD effect.
My results are robust to including 2004 accession countries in the sample.
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Table 4.1: EUSD and Incorporation Activity. This table regresses incorporation activity for a given investor
country i and month t on an indicators if i is a EU country and t falls in a specified window. The time window for
MarJul2005EU it is March, April, May, June, or July 2005, and the window for PostJul2005EU it is August 2005
and onward. In Column (1), the dependent variable is an indicator variable if investors in country i incorporated entities
during month t; in Columns (2)-(6) the dependent variable equals the natural log of 1+ the number of incorporations
from country i in month t. Column (3) fully interacts the model from (2) with an indicator if the investor is a person
(non-company), and column (4) is a within-country analysis of treated countries. Column (5) allows EU nations to
have a different linear time trend. Column (6) includes StockMarketGrowthit, the percentage growth in country i’s
stock market from the same month in the prior year, and CPIGrowthit which measures the year over year percentage
growth in the seasonaly adjusted consumer price index for month t in investor country i. Each column includes
observations of incorporations from 2002 through 2007 where the investor country is not a member of the 2004 EU
enlargement. The model is estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by investor country. *, **, and ***
denote two-sided statisitical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Indicator Log Transformation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MarJul2005EU 0.204∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗ 0.015 0.598∗∗ 0.536∗∗
(0.048) (0.217) (0.065) (0.240) (0.250)
PostJul2005EU 0.072 0.196∗ −0.071∗ 0.288∗ 0.276
(0.046) (0.118) (0.037) (0.163) (0.174)
MarJul2005EU × Person 0.565∗∗ 0.630∗
(0.245) (0.355)
PostJul2005EU × Person 0.348∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.143)
EUTrend −0.028 −0.056∗
(0.029) (0.032)
StockMarketGrowth 0.001∗
(0.0003)
CPIGrowth −0.003
(0.003)
Fixed Effects
Investor Country: Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Month and Year: Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Investor Country × Person Indicator: No No Yes Yes No No
Month and Year × Person Indicator: No No Yes No No No
Investor Country × Month and Year: No No No Yes No No
N 12,288 12,288 24,576 2,160 12,288 3,502
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Given the EUSD affected individual accounts, I should only detect an effect when the share-
holder is a person. In Columns (3) and (4) I split the dependent variable into incorporations based
on whether or not the shareholder listed in the data is a personal name. In Column (3) I interact
the covariates, investor country fixed effects, and time fixed effects with an indicator if the investor
is a person. This specification allows me to determine both if treated countries increase relative
to control countries and if the increase was concentrated in the non-corporate investors. I find
no significant increase for the non-person investors in EU countries during the run-up period; the
entire effect is concentrated in the person-held entities. In Column (4) I conduct a within-investor
country analysis, using each investor country’s person-held incorporations as the treatment groups
and the corresponding non-person-held incorporations as control groups. I do so by limiting the
sample to EU countries, including investor country× time fixed effects along with investor country
× person fixed effects, and including the interacted covariates. The advantage of this specification
is that it rules out my results being driven by country-level, time-varying differences between the
treatment and control groups. Again, I find an increase for the run-up period, which falls in the
post-implementation period but remains higher than the pre-period.
While investor country fixed effects account for time-invariant differences across investor coun-
tries, and time fixed effects allow for monthly differences in the average country’s incorporation
activity, the model does not account for divergent changes at the country-level over time. To guard
against this possibility producing spurious results, I estimate two additional specifications. I em-
ploy the approach outlined in Angrist and Pischke (2014) and in column (5) I allow the treatment
group to have its own linear time trend, relaxing the parallel trends assumption somewhat. In
Column (6) I control for changes in the market and economic conditions in the investor country
directly using monthly data from the World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor dataset. I include
StockMarketGrowth it, growth in the investor country’s stock market from the same month in the
prior year, which controls for the effects of changes in investor wealth driving incorporation activ-
ity. I also add CPIGrowth it, year-over-year growth in country i’s seasonally-adjusted consumer
price index for month t, to control for inflationary pressures. During periods of high inflation at
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home, investors may increase their use of tax havens as a safe location to preserve the value of
their wealth. My findings are robust in both specifications.
Lastly, I probe the parallel trends assumption more directly by looking at intertemporal dy-
namics. In Figure 4.1 I plot coefficient estimates and associated 90% confidence intervals for the
following equation:
ln(1 + Incorporationsit) =α1Q2 2002 EUit + α2Q3 2002 EUit + . . .
+ α19Q4 2006 EUit + βi + γt + εit
(4.2)
where QX 200Y EU is an indicator that turns on for treated countries in the X th quarter of year
200Y . Thus each point on the graph represents the difference-in-difference estimate for a particular
quarter, using January 2002-March 2003 as the reference period. Consistent with the parallel
trends assumption, there is no difference between treated and control observations until the last
quarter before the EUSD implementation. Then, I observe a large spike as investors rush to conceal
their foreign assets, followed by a post-implementation equilibrium with a significantly higher
level of incorporation activity from treated countries’ investors. The precision of the spike before
implementation makes it highly unlikely that the behavior I observe is caused by something other
than the EUSD rollout.
4.1.2 Bank Response to EUSD
Another method for investors to circumvent the bank information exchange or withholding
provisions of the EUSD would be for investors to close their EUSD-area foreign bank accounts
and open accounts in a non-EUSD jurisdiction such as Singapore. This possibility is particularly
harmful to banks in the EUSD area on two levels. First, a rash of withdrawals could undermine
the banks’ solvency and prompt a run (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner 2005).
Second, the loss of EU investors could result in non-EU investors losing trust that the EUSD
tax havens will remain non-cooperative with non-haven governments going forward. Konrad and
Stolper (2016) presents a model of tax havens where investors obtain strategic complementarities
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Figure 4.1: Quarterly differences in incorporation activity. This graph depicts coefficient estimates
and associated 90% confidence intervals from estimating: ln(1 + Incorporationsit) = α1Q2 2002 Treatedit +
α2Q3 2002 Treatedit + . . .+ α19Q4 2006 Treatedit + βi + γt + εit where i denotes investor country and t denotes
month and year. Q2 2002 Treatedit is an indicator if i is an EU treated country and t is April, May, or June 2002. The
other quarterly indicators are created similarly. The model is estimated on monthly incorporation counts from January
2001 through December 2006. January 2001 through March 2002 is the reference period. For the analysis, I exclude
2004 EU accession countries and those on the Gravelle (2009) tax haven list from those implementing the EU Savings
Directive (the final EUSD country list is: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). June 3, 2003 (depicted by the dotted blue line) is
the EUSD enactment date and July 1, 2005 (depicted by the dashed blue line) is the effective date for information
exchange or withholding tax for applicable account holders.
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by investing in the same tax haven. Because high profits on tax haven business serve as a com-
mitment device for the haven country to withstand political pressure to cooperate with non-haven
governments, investors derive benefit from coordinating tax haven use. Without profits from the
EU investors, the amount of political pressure it takes to compel the EUSD-area tax havens to co-
operate decreases, making their use riskier for non-EU investors. Thus, the EUSD-area banks, and
by extension their respective governments have a strong incentive to help their clients circumvent
the EUSD’s provisions.
I predict that to stave off EUSD-induced depositor flight, affected banks take steps to signal
to EU account holders that their accounts will remain anonymous. One way they can do so is
by making the transition to an offshore entity seamless for their account holders, taking on the
logistical efforts and thus bearing some of the costs of the concealment technology. Thus, I test if
affected banks take an active role in facilitating tax evasion by orchestrating the creation of offshore
entities. The intermediary data of the Panama Papers allows identification of which entities were
created under the direction of a bank.
I categorize intermediaries as banks if their names include any of the substrings “BANK”,
“BANC”, “BANQU”, “CREDIT”, or “CRE´DIT”. This classification results in 256 bank interme-
diaries, though many represent multiple branches of a parent bank. For instance, there are separate
intermediary entries for HSBC Private Bank in Switzerland, Monaco, Luxembourg, Guernsey, Jer-
sey, and the United States. The vast majority of the time when the bank serves as the intermediary,
it creates a bearer share entity. This arrangement affords a high level of anonymity for the investor
because whoever holds the physical share certificates is the owner of the company; no ownership
registry is maintained by Mossack Fonseca or the incorporation jurisdiction. It also allows banks to
orchestrate the process of setting up an offshore entity on behalf of a high-value depositor without
violating bank secrecy and sharing the depositor’s information with Mossack Fonseca. However,
it in turn means the bearer’s identity (and hence home country) is not observable in the Panama
Papers data. This gap in investor country information limits the strength of my tests of bank com-
plicity in circumventing the EUSD.
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To detect a bank response to the EUSD, I analyze intertemporal changes in the rate of bank
involvement in offshore incorporations. Figure 4.2, Panel A presents the monthly counts of in-
corporations with bank intermediaries. After enactment of the EUSD (depicted by the left dotted
vertical line), the number of bank-facilitated incorporations per month increases dramatically up to
the effective date (depicted by the right dashed vertical line). After the effective date, the number
of incorporations falls but remains higher than before the EUSD was enacted. While this spike
in Panel A is dramatic, it does not reveal if the increase in bank-facilitated incorporations is a re-
sult of a numerator effect (banks representing a disproportionately large share of the activity) or
a denominator effect (overall incorporations increasing). Panel B tracks the monthly percentage
of incorporations with a bank intermediary. The similar plot pattern to Panel A suggests that the
increase is not driven solely by a denominator effect; banks facilitated a disproportionately large
number of incorporations in the lead-up to the EUSD’s effective date.
Table 4.2 tests for statistical differences in the proportion of incorporations facilitated by
a bank. I partition incorporations into 4 periods: Pre-enactment (January 2002 - May 2003),
Early Run-up (June 2003 - February 2005), Late Run-up (March 2005 - July 2005), and Post-
implementation (August 2005 - December 2007). Panel A presents the counts and proportions
by time period. Prior to the EUSD’s enactment, bank facilitated incorporations represent 6% of
the overall activity. However between the enactment and effective dates, bank involvement grows
steadily to nearly 21% of incorporation activity. After the effective date passes, bank involvement
falls to just under 12%. Panel B breaks down the bank-driven incorporations by bank country and
time period. The primary bank countries are all locations where the bank would be subject to the
EUSD’s withholding regime and at risk for depositor flight. The increase being concentrated in
EUSD-area banks is comforting, as I predict the effect is limited to these banks.5 Panel C presents
the results of χ2 tests of equal proportions using the data from Panel A. The changes in bank in-
volvement are all highly statistically significant, as is a test of an increasing linear trend in bank
5However, the low involvement from non-EUSD banks precludes my using them as a control group in a difference-in-
difference design.
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Figure 4.2: Bank-orchestrated incorporation activity. Panel A depicts the monthly incorporation
counts where the linked intermediary has a bank term in its name (“BANK”, “BANC”, “BANQU”, “CREDIT”, or
“CRE´DIT”). Panel B presents the counts from Panel A scaled by the overall monthly incorporation counts, expressed
as a percentage. June 3, 2003 (depicted by the dotted blue line) is the EUSD enactment date and July 1, 2005 (de-
picted by the dashed blue line) is the effective date for information exchange or withholding tax for applicable account
holders.
0
200
400
600
Jan 2002 Jan 2004 Jan 2006 Jan 2008
C
ou
nt
s
Panel A: Bank-orchestrated incorporation counts by month
0
10
20
30
Jan 2002 Jan 2004 Jan 2006 Jan 2008
Incorporation Month and Year
Pe
rc
en
t
Panel B: Percent of incorporations that are bank-orchestrated by month
27
involvement between the enactment and effective dates.
Table 4.2: Bank orchestration of offshore entity creation. This table presents incorporation activity
when the name of the intermediary linked to the offshore entity contains a bank term (“BANK”, “BANC”, “BANQU”,
“CREDIT”, or “CRE´DIT”). The sample is all Panama Papers Officer-Entity pairs with an incorporation date between
January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2007.
Panel A: Bank involvement by time period
Period Dates Bank Non-bank Proportion
Pre-enactment Jan 2002 - May 2003 590 9204 0.06
Early Run-up Jun 2003 - Feb 2005 2852 18 894 0.13
Late Run-up Mar 2005 - Jul 2005 1643 6304 0.21
Post-implementation Aug 2005 - Dec 2007 3519 26 642 0.12
Panel B: Bank involvement by bank country
Country Counts Percentages
Pre Early Late Post Pre Early Late Post
Luxembourg 360 2092 1098 2686 41.0 66.3 61.5 67.1
Switzerland 167 334 298 662 19.0 10.6 16.7 16.5
Monaco 45 235 292 365 5.1 7.4 16.4 9.1
Andorra 0 204 1 14 0.0 6.5 0.1 0.3
Guernsey 113 109 46 85 12.9 3.5 2.6 2.1
Jersey 157 58 8 6 17.9 1.8 0.4 0.1
Other 37 123 42 184 4.1 4.0 2.4 4.4
Panel C: χ2 Tests of equal proportions
Comparison χ2 Test Statistic P-Value
Pre-enactment to Early Run-up 348.5 0.000
Pre-enactment to Late Run-up 854.5 0.000
Pre-enactment to Post-implementation 254.6 0.000
Early Run-up to Late Run-up 258.3 0.000
Linear Trend during entire Run-up (Jun 2003-Jul 2005) 576.8 0.000
Identification of an EUSD effect on bank involvement using the χ2 tests assumes that in the ab-
sence the EUSD, the proportion of incorporations with bank involvement would not have changed
intertemporally. This is an admittedly strong assumption. However, for another force to be caus-
ing this intertemporal pattern, it would need to be absent prior to June 2003, increase progressively
until July 2005 and then sharply fall. I know of no other reasonable explanation that explains this
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distinctive intertemporal signature.
Additionally, the time patterns of the incorporations bolster my story that these incorpora-
tions are indeed bank-driven and not investor-demanded. While the narrow spike in incorporations
around the EUSD effective date in Figure 4.1 suggests investors waited until the last minute to
take action, Figure 4.2 shows that banks—most likely better aware of the impending regulation—
acted sooner to preempt depositor flight. Additionally, clustering of bank activity (not tabulated)
is consistent with bank-driven behavior. For instance, 187 of the 204 incorporations from Andorra
banks during the early run-up period came from one bank during a 4-day window (November 30,
2004-December 3, 2004); it is highly unlikely for so many depositors to request an offshore entity
in such a short window. Overall, the results suggest that EUSD-area banks catering to offshore tax
evasion were complicit in helping investors circumvent the EUSD, presumably in response to their
EUSD-driven competitive disadvantage.
4.2 Individual and Corporate Account Information Exchange
The evidence reported thus far suggests investors and banks employ offshore entities to cir-
cumvent the exchange of individual account information. However, the response to exchanging
corporate account information as well is an open question. To test the response, I exploit an
amendment to the EUSD and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).
4.2.1 Amended EUSD
In May 2013 the EU issued a draft amendment to the EUSD that would close the loophole for
corporate accounts. The amendment would force EUSD-area financial institutions to look back
through pass-through entities to identify beneficial owners of accounts, and use those identities as
the basis for withholding tax or exchanging information with the investor’s home tax authority.
Assuming banks have the information and are compliant, such a change would make offshore
entities an ineffective concealment technology for EU investors that use financial institutions in
the EUSD coverage area. While the amendment was not passed until December 2014, given the
concurrent developments with FATCA, practitioner articles at the time covering the amendment
predicted that its eventual passage and implementation was inevitable. As a result, I consider that
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in May 2013, investors anticipated that the amendment would eventually be passed, and I predict
that after that point in time affected investors are more likely to close down their offshore entities.
As mentioned earlier, investors may use offshore entities for variety of purposes—some of
which have nothing to do with tax evasion—and the Panama Papers data do not explicitly state
why the entity was created. However, I can take advantage of the introduction of the original
EUSD as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in the reason. Given the results in Sec-
tion 4.1.1, many of the entities incorporated by EU investors around the July 1, 2005 roll-out date
are likely created specifically for evading information exchange with the investor’s tax authority.
From a research design standpoint, this shock creates differences in the intended usage of enti-
ties along two dimensions—cross-country and intertemporally—which allows for multiple control
groups in a difference-in-difference framework. By showing using two different benchmarks that
concealment-motivated entities are more likely to close in response to the move to exchanging
both individual and corporate account information, I am able to rule out potential confounds along
investor country and time dimensions.
I conduct a hazard-model adaptation of the standard difference-in-difference design. I cate-
gorize entities created by EU investors between March 1, 2005 (four months before the effective
date) and July 31, 2005 (one month after the effective date) as evasion-driven, and thus highly-
sensitive to the effects of additional corporate account information exchange. I refer to this group
as the treatment group. I then employ three reference groups. The first group consists of entities
created by non-EU investors over the March-July 2005 period. The second group is entities from
EU investors incorporated between January 1, 2002 and June 3, 2003—before the EUSD was en-
acted. The third is from non-EU, OECD investors over the same pre-enactment period. As entities
in these three reference groups were either not affected by the EUSD or were created before the
EUSD was enacted, the incidence of entities created primarily for tax evasion purposes should be
lower than the treatment group.
Figure 4.3 plots Kaplan-Meier survival curves for entities in these four groups from August
2005 onward. For entities that have been terminated, the data will include one or two end dates.
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The “inactivation date” represents the date the investor told Mossack Fonseca to close the entity
down. Investors are required to pay annual licensing fees, and if they fail to make a payment, Mos-
sack Fonseca will “strike off” the entity. These striking-off purges happen annually at a minimum.6
Although abandoning an entity represents an investor decision not to continue using the offshore
entity, the struck-off date does not represent the date the investor chose to stop using the entity.
As a result, I consider entities to be right-censored one year before the struck-off date (when the
last registration would have been paid) or the end of the sample (December 31, 2015) if there is no
inactivation date.7
The dashed blue line indicates when the EU issued the draft amendment closing the EUSD
loophole. Panel A overlays survival curves from the treatment group and the three control groups.
Panels B through D present comparisons between curve pairs for clarity. I first look to see if the
closure rate of entities in the treatment group responds to the issuance of the draft amendment.
Prior to the draft amendment, entities in the treatment group exhibit a low closure rate, depicted
by a shallow curve. This pattern is consistent with the idea that these entities serve a tax evasion
purpose—investors would need to maintain these entities so long as they were concealing assets.
After the draft amendment the curve becomes substantially steeper, reflecting a much faster closure
rate.
Panel B compares the behavior of the treatment group to control group 1: entities contempo-
raneously incorporated by non-EU OECD investors. This comparison suggests that the increase in
closure rate is in response to enhanced information exchange eroding the concealment benefits of
entities. Control group 1’s curve is initially steeper, possibly reflective of a greater proportion of
the entities being used for more “transactional” purposes. Unlike the treatment group curve, there
is no discernible change in slope around the draft amendment, and by March 2014 the two curves
6Mossack Fonseca’s purge schedule differs by offshore jurisdiction. Purges happen in the British Virgin Islands each
year in April and October. In Panama purges occur in January and July. The Bahamas and Seychelles offices purge
entities annually in December whereas the Samoa office purges in February. Purges occur at the end of each calendar
quarter in Anguilla.
7If I consider struck-off dates to be valid closure dates along with inactivation dates, the curves look virtually identical
(figure not included for brevity).
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Figure 4.3: Closure response to increased information exchange. This graph plots Kaplan-Meier sur-
vival curves based on the investor country and incorporation date. I consider entities to be closed on the “inactivation
date” in the data, or right-censored at the minimum of the “struck-off date” or December 31, 2015. The treatment
group consists of entities incorporated by EU investors between March 1, 2005 and July 31, 2005. Control group
1 consists of entities incorporated by non-EU, OECD investors contemporaneous with the treatment group. Control
group 2 represents entities incorporated by EU investors between January 1, 2002 and June 3, 2003. Control group
3 is entities incorporated by non-EU, OECD investors contemporaneous with control group 2. The error bars depict
95% confidence intervals.
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cross, indicating that on a proportional basis, at this point more treatment group entities have been
closed than those in control group 1. Thus, the increase in the closure rate around May 2013 for
the treatment group seems to be unique to entities incorporated by EU investors.
It is possible that non-EU OECD investors are different from EU investors, and the entities
created by them are different along dimensions unrelated to their use as a tax evasion tool. If that
were the case, control group 1 would be an unsuitable benchmark. To rule out this possibility, I
take advantage of intertemporal differences within the investor country and use control group 2—
entities created by EU investors in 2002 and early 2003 (prior to the enactment of the EUSD)—as
an alternate benchmark. Comparing control group 2’s curve to the treatment group’s in Panel C,
the story is the same as in Panel B. Thus, it appears that the change in closure rate for the treatment
group in 2013 is not a result of differences between EU and non-EU OECD countries unrelated to
the tax evasion difference. For added comfort, in Panel D I compare control group 2 and control
group 3 (entities from non-EU OECD investors incorporated in the pre-enactment period). These
two curves move in lockstep, suggesting that in the absence of the EUSD, EU and non-EU OECD
investors use offshore entities for similar reasons.
I more formally evaluate these comparisons using a Cox proportional hazard model:
hi(t) = h0(t) exp(α1TreatmentGroupi + α2(TreatmentGroupi × PostAmendment t)) (4.3)
where i subscripts entity-investor pairs and t subscripts time (year and month). TreatmentGroupi
is an indicator if the entity-investor pair is from the treatment group, and PostAmendment t is an
indicator if t is after May 2013. h0(t) is an unspecified, time-dependent baseline hazard function
representing closures in the control group. Intuitively, the baseline hazard function can have an
arbitrary shape, allowing for time-varying differences in the closure rate; the treatment curve has
the same overall “shape,” but has the freedom to pivot at the origin and again at the May 2013 date.
I cluster standard errors at the investor country level.
Table 4.3 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) compare the treatment group to control
group 1 (contemporaneous incorporations from non-EU OECD country investors) and control
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group 2 (2002 and early 2003 incorporations from EU investors), respectively. Both columns show
that initially the likelihood of closure is lower for treatment observations by about 54%, consistent
with these entities needing to be maintained so long as the assets were being concealed from the
investor’s home country tax authority. After the May 2013 date, the hazard rate increases precip-
itously for treatment group entities relative to both control groups. Compared to control group 1,
the hazard rate increases by 411% after the May 2013 date to a rate 2.26 times that of the control
group (0.548× 4.115). Relative to control group 2, the change is even more dramatic—increasing
by 9.21 times after May 2013 to be 5 times that of the control group (0.544× 9.210)
Column (3) compares control groups 2 and 3 as a placebo test. If EU and non-EU investors
use offshore entities for similar reasons, I should observe no differences. Similar to Panel D of
Figure 4.3, I detect no statistically significant differences when employing the same style Cox
model as in columns (1) and (2).
The sharpness of the inflection point and its precise alignment with the issuance of the EUSD
draft amendment make a strong case that the effect is a result of the regulatory change. However
regulatory changes do not occur in isolation, and contaminating forces are potentially at play. One
such force is the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), which institutes mandates information shar-
ing like the strengthened EUSD but on a worldwide basis (it was modeled on the US’s FATCA
program and operates similarly). Countries, however, did not begin committing to CRS implemen-
tation until 2014, so while CRS may have contributed to the continued high closure rate late in the
analysis period, it cannot explain the inflection point in 2013.
Similarly, over this time period, many of the EU countries had in place voluntary disclosure/tax
amnesty programs. Langenmayr (2015) shows that ceteris paribus, the existence of such programs
increases the incidence of evasion because they provide evaders with the option to come clean if
the perceived probability of detection increases. Hence, at the sunset of such a program, investors
may be more apt to close their entities while they still can obtain amnesty. If an amnesty program
was drawing to a close when the EU issued the draft amendment, the observed increase in entity
closures may be a result of the end of amnesty rather than the strengthened EUSD. To rule out
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Table 4.3: Closures of evasion-motivated entities. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the model: hi(t) =
h0(t) exp(α1TreatmentGroupi + α2(TreatmentGroupi × PostAmendment t)). i subscripts entity-investor pairs
and t subscripts time (Month and Year). TreatmentGroupi is an indicator equaling 1 if the entity is a member of
the treatment group, and PostAmendement t is an indicator equaling 1 if t > May 2013. Column (1) estimates the
model for the treatment group (entities incorporated by EU investors between March 1, 2005 and July 31, 2005) and
control group 1 (entities incorporated by non-EU, OECD country investors between March 1, 2005 and July 31, 2005).
Column (2) estimates the model for the treatment group and control group 2 (entities incorporated by EU investors
between January 1, 2002 and June 3, 2003). Column (3) is a placebo test comparing control group 2 with control group
3 (entities incorporated by non-EU, OECD country investors between January 1, 2002 and June 3, 2003). Column
(4) excludes from the sample EUSD-area countries that ended a voluntary disclosure/amnesty program during 2013
or 2014. Observations are at risk from August 1, 2005 onwards. I consider an entity to be closed on the “inactivation
date” or right-censored one year before the “struck-off date” or December 31, 2015, whichever is earlier. Reported
coefficients are in unexponentiated form, with exponentiated hazard ratios at the bottom of the table. Standard errors
are clustered at the investor country level. *, **, and *** denote two-sided statisitical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TreatmentGroup −0.602∗∗ −0.608∗∗ −0.626∗∗
(0.275) (0.275) (0.281)
Treatment Group × PostAmendment 1.415∗∗∗ 2.220∗∗∗ 1.413∗∗∗
(0.398) (0.404) (0.420)
ControlGroup2 −0.234
(0.156)
ControlGroup2 × PostAmendment 0.065
(0.257)
Sample Composition
Treatment Group: Yes Yes No Yes
Control Group 1: Yes No No Yes
Control Group 2: No Yes Yes No
Control Group 3: No No Yes No
Exclude EUSD Countries with Ending Amnesty: No No No Yes
Number of Entity-Investor Pairs 1134 1343 884 1097
Number of Closure Events 554 581 282 529
Exponentiated Coefficients
TreatmentGroup 0.548 0.544 0.535
Treatment Group × PostAmendment 4.115 9.210 4.108
ControlGroup2 0.792
ControlGroup2 × PostAmendment 1.067
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this possibility, I identify the EUSD-area countries that became less forgiving in their voluntary
disclosure/amnesty programs during 2013 or 2014, exclude those countries and estimate the model
comparing this subsample to control group 1.8 Column (4) presents the results; the estimates are
virtually identical, ruling out terminations of voluntary disclosure programs driving my results.
4.2.2 FATCA
One of the major limitations of the EUSD is its scope: while the EU can compel banks in EU
countries and their overseas territories to comply, it has no legal authority to force financial insti-
tutions in other areas to take part in the scheme. In enacting the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (FATCA), the United States took a different approach to pressure offshore banking institutions.
Targeting the estimated $1 trillion in US offshore wealth (Alstadsæter et al. 2017), FATCA requires
registered Foreign Financial Institutions (FFIs) to identify US account holders and provide identity
(e.g. name and taxpayer ID number) and asset information to the IRS on an annual basis. FATCA’s
bite comes from how it leverages the size and scale of the US financial sector to compel foreign
financial institutions to comply. FATCA mandates that US institutions and other compliant FFIs
withhold a 30% tax on US-sourced payments to non-compliant FFIs. This tax virtually locks non-
compliant FFIs out of the US financial system, and because the US financial system is so integral
to the worldwide financial system, remaining non-compliant is not a feasible option. The incentive
to comply only grows stronger as more foreign institutions register.
Like the amended EUSD, information exchange under FATCA is not limited to individual
accounts. FFIs must identify US-owned foreign corporations, defined as entities with over 10%
indirect or direct US ownership. As a result, for an account held in the name of an offshore entity,
the bank must trace back ownership to test against the 10% threshold. FATCA explicitly states
what criteria should flag an account as potentially US-investor owned. If there are any “indicia” of
8I obtain the EUSD-area countries that ended voluntary disclosure programs from a survey by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (2015). Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands had voluntary
disclosure programs that ended or became less forgiving in 2013 or 2014. Throughout the EUSD-area, the United
Kingdom was the only country to expand a voluntary disclosure program during 2013 or 2014. I also estimate the
model excluding UK investors (untabulated) and find no change in my results, suggesting that my results are not
driven by the launch of a voluntary disclosure/amnesty program.
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US ownership, such as a US phone number, a US address, or a standing order to transfer funds to
a US bank, the FFI must suspect US ownership.
A necessary condition for the FFI to be able to report accounts owned by US investors is that
the bank has knowledge of the beneficial owners. If the bank has no knowledge of an entity’s
shareholders, it cannot report this information to the IRS. While banks historically have been
willing and able to open accounts without knowing the ultimate customer, the introduction of
“know your customer” (KYC) and “anti-money laundering” (AML) laws in virtually every country
restricted their ability to do so. Enacted and/or strengthened throughout the 2000s primarily to fight
terrorist funding and other illegal activity, KYC and AML laws compel financial institutions to
conduct due diligence on who is opening the account. This diligence typically includes obtaining
passports of the beneficial owners and learning the source of funds. As a result, provided they
conduct the requisite due diligence, financial institutions cannot claim ignorance when performing
FATCA searches for US beneficial owners.
To test for an effect of FATCA on offshore entity usage, I conduct a difference-in-difference
analysis of incorporations with US investors as the treatment group and non-US investors as the
control group. One of the main challenges in such an approach is determining an appropriate treat-
ment date. While FATCA was enacted in 2010, at first it was highly uncertain if the US govern-
ment would be able to actually implement it. Financial institutions—both in the US and abroad—
objected to becoming de facto IRS agents, and foreign countries—particularly in the EU—voiced
concerns about privacy. In many jurisdictions, complying with FATCA and exchanging informa-
tion with the IRS would cause foreign financial institutions to violate local law. As a result, in the
second half of 2012, the US government began to develop intergovernmental agreements (IGAs)
with foreign governments to iron out some of the implementation details. While these agreements
brought FATCA implementation closer to reality, the countries signing IGAs early on did not have
a reputation for facilitating offshore tax evasion.9 As a result, investor expectations likely did not
9France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US developed a model intergovernmental agreement (IGA) that cleared
the way for FATCA exchanges from those countries. Released July 2012, this “Model 1” IGA stipulated that FFIs
would collect the required information on US taxpayers and submit it to their local government. In turn, the foreign
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shift substantially in response to these agreements.
While anticipation of FATCA may have increased somewhat prior to 2013, two events at the
beginning of 2013 likely shifted investor expectations considerably. On January 17, 2013 the IRS
developed implementation rules and released final regulations. In February 14, 2013 Switzerland
signed an IGA with the US government, effectively ending Swiss banking secrecy for US clients
and allowing for FATCA exchanges. Given Swiss banks’ prominence in the offshore financial in-
dustry, that Switzerland was forced to comply likely sent a strong signal to investors that other bank
secrecy jurisdictions would not be able to withstand pressure. Since then, the total number of coun-
tries having signed IGAs has exceeded 80 with an additional 30 countries reaching “agreements in
substance,” covering virtually all of the developed world.
I use January 17, 2013—the date the IRS published the final regulations—as the date when
investor expectations changed. Both the finality of the regulations and announcements of key
signed (and pending) IGAs around this period eliminated any remaining doubt that the regulation
would actually be carried out. Conversations with a practitioner specializing in FATCA com-
pliance confirm that prior to January 2013, clients were typically either unaware of the pending
roll-out or hoped the complexities of international relations would undermine the US’s ability to
execute FATCA. Partial anticipation before this date or investors remaining uncertain of FATCA’s
inevitability after this date will dampen the treatment effect in my difference-in-difference tests.
In figure 4.4 I plot monthly incorporation activity from US investors. The dashed blue line
represents January 17, 2013; after this date, US investors’ incorporation activity falls substantially,
consistent with offshore entities losing value as a tax evasion tool for US investors.10
government would then forward on the information to the IRS. After the release of the Model 1 IGA, the UK signed
in September, Denmark and Mexico signed in November, and Ireland signed in December. While Ireland is included
in a number of tax haven lists (e.g. Gravelle (2009)), it primarily serves as a corporate tax haven and is not a major
locale for individual offshore evasion.
10The outlier point in February 2012 is driven by one entity with nearly 1000 investor links. To guard against overes-
timation of the effect size because of this one outlier, I exclude February 2012 from all of my FATCA regressions.
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Figure 4.4: Incorporations around FATCA. Points depict the average number of incorporations per month
from US investors. The dashed blue line indicates January 2013—the point in time I consider investor expectations of
FATCA actually being implemented to have changed.
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To test for an effect more formally, I employ the following model:
ln(1 + Incorporations it) = αPostFATCAit + βi + γt + εit (4.4)
where PostFATCAit takes a value of 1 if country i is the United states and t is after January 2013.
βi and γt are investor country and time (month and year) fixed effects, leaving α as the estimate
of the change in incorporation activity for US investors around the January 2013 date. I estimate
the regression using observations from January 2010 (just before FATCA’s March 2010 enactment
date) through December 2014. Table 4.4 presents the results.
Column (1) shows that after January 2013, Offshore incorporation activity from US investors
declined by roughly one-third (e−0.390 = 0.68). On April 9, 2013, France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
and the UK announced they would conduct FATCA-style exchanges among themselves and the
US, likely signaling to investors in these countries that their offshore entities are no longer safe.
Thus, in Column (2) I include an indicator PostEU5Announce it that turns on if i is one of these 5
countries and t ≥ April 2013. Similar to FATCA, I find a roughly 16% reduction in the number of
incorporations per month from these countries (e−0.169 = 0.84).
To verify that intertemporal differences between developed and emerging economies are not
driving the result, in Column (3) I re-estimate the model using observations from OECD countries
only. The result is robust to this alternate specification. In Column (4) I relax the parallel trend
assumption by allowing incorporation activity from US investors to have a different linear and
quadratic trend from other countries’ investors over time. The coefficient on PostFATCAit remains
negative and significant even allowing for independent linear and quadratic trends in incorporation
activity for US investors, but the magnitude of the effect decreases slightly.
On June 14, 2013 the ICIJ released an earlier batch of leaked offshore entity data from two
providers: Portcullis TrustNet and Commonwealth Trust Limited. This leak is much smaller than
the Panama Papers leak and the data ended years before it was released, but it may have scared off
investors considering incorporating offshore. If investors from all countries are affected similarly,
the time fixed effects should absorb it. However, if US investors respond to the 2013 leak more
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Table 4.4: Regression Evidence of FATCA and Incorporation Activity. Column (1) estimates the
model: ln(1 + Incorporationsit) = αPostFATCAit + βi + γt + εit. i subscripts investor country and t subscripts
time (Month and Year). PostFATCAit is an indicator equaling 1 if t > January 2013 and i is the United States.
Column (2) adds an indicator PostEU5Announceit which equals 1 if t ≥ April 2013 and i is France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, or the UK. Column (4) adds two additional variables to the model from column (1). UStrend it is the number
of months after December 2009 if i is the United States and 0 otherwise. UStrend2 it is the square of UStrend it.
Column (5) adds one variable to the model from column (1); PostOffshoreLeaksUS it is an indicator equaling 1 if t >
June 2013 and i is the United States. Column (6) adds StockMarketGrowthit, the percentage growth in country i’s
stock market from the same month in the prior year, and CPIGrowthit, which measures the year over year percentage
growth in the seasonally adjusted consumer price index for month t in investor country i. Each column is estimated
on incorporation activity between January 2010 and December 2014 from non-haven investor countries. Column (3)
further restricts the sample to investors from OECD countries. The model is estimated using OLS with standard errors
clustered by investor country and time. *, **, and *** denote two-sided statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively.
ln(1 + Incorporations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PostFATCA −0.390∗∗∗ −0.395∗∗∗ −0.362∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.048) (0.067) (0.051) (0.049) (0.056)
PostEU5Announce −0.169∗∗
(0.074)
UStrend 0.023∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
UStrend2 −0.0004∗∗∗ 0.00001 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
PostOffshoreLeaksUS −0.396∗∗∗ −0.402∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.078)
StockMarketGrowth 0.0003
(0.001)
CPIGrowth 0.002
(0.006)
Sample Composition
Investor Countries All All OECD All All All
Fixed Effects
Investor Country: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month and Year: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,077 7,077 1,488 7,077 7,077 2,969
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negatively than investors in other countries, it could show up in my estimate of the FATCA effect.
To address this possibility, in Column (5) I employ the same specification from Column (4), but
also include an indicator PostOffshoreLeaksUS it which turns on for US investors after June 2013.
In this specification, my estimate of the FATCA effect is largely unchanged, but the coefficient
of PostOffshoreLeaksUS it absorbs most of the linear trend and all of the quadratic trend in US
incorporation activity, suggesting that the leak is not driving my results. The leak may dispropor-
tionately affect US investors because of FATCA (FATCA combined with weaker than expected
identity protections may be particularly troubling to US investors considering using offshore enti-
ties), but I am unable to test if such an interactive effect exists. To help rule out changing market
and economic conditions driving my results, in Column (6), I control for growth in the investor’s
stock market and local consumer price index. Inclusion of these variables does not meaningfully
change my estimates of FATCA’s effect.
The time fixed effects account for monthly differences in the average country’s incorporation
activity. However, as the fourth most active non-haven investor country in terms of incorporation
activity, the US is not an average country. As a result, using intertemporal changes in the average
country’s incorporation activity may be insufficient as a predictor of changes in US incorporation
activity. To address this possibility, I test to see if the proportion of US incorporation activity
changed from the pre- to post-period. Table 4.5 presents the results of a χ2 test of equal proportions.
In the year prior to the January 17, 2013 date when the IRS released the final FATCA rules, US
investors represented 4.7% of incorporation activity worldwide, excluding haven country investors
and instances where the investor country is unknown (i.e. bearer share entities). In the subsequent
year, US activity falls to 2.8%, and this difference in proportions is significant with a P-value of
better than 0.001. When I further constrain the comparison group to OECD investors only over the
same periods, I observe a decline from 23.4% to 16.8%, which is again significant with a P-value
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of better than 0.001.11
Table 4.5: Proportionality of US incorporation activity around FATCA. This table presents compar-
isons of the Proportion of incorporation activity coming from US investors during various periods around FATCA. The
non-haven comparison group represents incorporation activity from non-US investors known to be from a non-haven
country per Gravelle (2009). The OECD comparison group adds the further restriction that the investor must hail from
an OECD country.
Comparison Groups
Non-Haven OECD
Period Dates US Count Count Proportion Count Proportion
Full pre-period Jan 1, 2010 - Jan 17, 2013 664 16181 0.039 2717 0.196
1-year Prior Jan 17, 2012 - Jan 17, 2013 262 5320 0.047 860 0.234
1-year Post Jan 18, 2013 - Jan 17, 2014 137 4777 0.028 677 0.168
Post, Pre-Leaks Jan 18, 2013 - Jun 14, 2013 71 2359 0.029 280 0.202
Non-Haven Countries Non-Haven OECD Countries
Comparison χ2 Test Statistic P-Value χ2 Test Statistic P-Value
Full pre-period to 1-year Post 13.961 0.000 3.171 0.075
1-year Prior to 1-year Post 25.435 0.000 11.864 0.001
1-year Prior to Post, Pre-Offshore Leaks 12.902 0.000 1.317 0.251
Across these specifications, my estimates of the effect size are large. In a concurrent working
paper, De Simone et al. (2017) use changes in Foreign Direct Investment from IGA-signing tax
havens to infer a similarly sized effect (22-31% decline in aggregate outbound FPI depending on
the specification). These large magnitudes raise the possibility that investors continue to evade but
simply change their concealment tactics.12 Without tax receipts I cannot definitively rule out such
a substitution effect, however, presumably any second choice concealment strategy entails greater
11I also compare the year prior to the period between January 18, 2013 through June 14, 2013 (when the ICIJ released
the earlier leak). When I compare changes in the proportion of US-investor activity relative to worldwide activity, I
observe a highly significant decline. However, I do not detect a statistically significant change relative to the OECD
countries over this short window.
12Some recent tax evasion studies find a substitution effect when one method of evasion becomes difficult. For exam-
ple, Slemrod, Collins, Hoopes, Reck, and Sebastiani (2017) find that after an enforcement change, small businesses
report an increase in their taxable receipts by 24%, but they also increase their reported expenses by a similar amount,
suggesting the evaders changed tactics and tax revenue changed little. Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singha (2017) find a
similar response in an Ecuadorian setting. On the other hand, using IRS data Johannesen, Langetieg, Reck, Risch,
and Slemrod (2017) find that first time Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR) filers responding to stepped-up en-
forcement increase their reported taxable income substantially (64% more interest income, 24% more dividends, and
13% more capital gains).
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risk or higher costs.
4.2.3 Ending Bank Secrecy
Critical to the amended EUSD and FATCA having bite in curbing the use of offshore entities
for evasion purposes, financial institutions must actually comply with the regulations. However,
financial institutions that benefit from the offshore tax evasion business have a strong business
incentive not to comply with information exchange programs, and the evidence in Section 4.1.2
shows that banks actively help clients to circumvent reporting. Thus, to confirm that the observed
effects are indeed a result of financial institutions’ exchange of corporate account information, I
test for an investor response to increases in bank cooperation with foreign tax authorities. To do
so, I exploit two shocks to the Swiss banking sector: UBS’s deferred prosecution with the US
Department of Justice and the launch of the Department of Justice’s Swiss bank program.
As the historic leading location for locating offshore wealth with over $5 trillion in 2007 (Al-
stadsæter et al. 2017), Switzerland is an ideal testbed. In February 2009, the US Department of
Justice announced that it had struck a deferred prosecution agreement with the Swiss bank UBS
for UBS’s role in facilitating US tax evasion. Under the terms of the agreement, UBS would turn
over its records of accounts held by US investors (including those employing offshore entities) and
cooperate with any criminal investigations and prosecutions. On the heels of a June 2008 guilty
plea from former UBS banker Bradley Birkenfeld and the November 2008 indictment of UBS
executive Raoul Weil for their roles in facilitating evasion, this deferred prosecution agreement
credibly communicated that UBS would not stonewall.
I predict that this agreement undermined investor credibility in the anonymity of Swiss bank
accounts held by offshore entities. While the UBS deferred prosecution agreement only established
the release of account information from one bank, UBS, to one country, the United States, the event
likely undermined worldwide faith in the secrecy of the entire Swiss banking system. As a result, I
hypothesize that investors whose entities used Swiss banks expected an increase in the probability
of detection. The continued use of these entities may also increase the penalty upon getting caught
if governments interpret the entities as evidence of intent to defraud the tax authority. Thus the
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expected cost of evasion increases, potentially from both the increase in probability of detection
and the increase in penalty upon detection.
Similar in effect to the 2009 shock, in August 2013 the Swiss and US governments established a
program where Swiss banks could cooperate with US government investigations into tax evasion in
exchange for non-prosecution agreements. The Swiss Federal Department of Finance encouraged
banks to take part in the program and 78 banks participated, representing a sizable portion of the
Swiss banking sector. I hypothesize that this program further increased investor expectations of
Swiss banks’ willingness to cooperate with foreign governments.
I test if investors respond to increases in the likelihood of bank cooperation by conducting a
difference-in-difference analysis on closure rates of corporate entities with Swiss bank exposure
around the two shocks. However, the released Panama Papers data do not specify the financial
institution used by the entities. Thus, as a proxy for having a Swiss bank account, I assume that
entities set up with a Swiss intermediary likely use a Swiss bank. It seems unlikely that a non-
Swiss investor would seek assistance from a Swiss law, accounting, or wealth management firm
but not use a Swiss financial institution.
Figure 4.5 presents Kaplan-Meier survival curves based on the entities being set up with a Swiss
intermediary. The sample consists of entities incorporated over a five year window, 2001-2006, that
were still active as of January 1, 2007. Like the prior survival analyses, I define the close date as
the inactivation date in the data, and right censor observations at the earlier of one year before the
struck-off date or December 31, 2015. Because of the potential confounds of the amended EUSD
with the 2013 shock, I exclude incorporations with EU investors.13 Since Section 4.1.2 shows that
many bearer share entities were created with direct involvement from banks, I exclude them as
well. I also exclude instances where the investor is listed as in a tax haven country, to make sure I
capture entities held directly by investors. The dashed blue line depicts the UBS shock whereas the
dotted blue line portrays the announcement of the Department of Justice’s Swiss bank program.
13The coincidental timing brings up the possibility that the results in Section 4.2.1 are driven by developments in the
Swiss banking industry and not the amended EUSD. To rule out this possibility I re-run the results from Section 4.2.1,
excluding entities where the intermediary is Swiss, and the results remain the same.
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Figure 4.5: Closures of entities likely using Swiss banks. This graph plots Kaplan-Meier survival curves
based on the incorporation having a Swiss intermediary. The sample include all entity-officer pairs incorporated
between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2006, excluding instances where the investor country is in the EU or is
Tax Haven Country per Gravelle (2009), and omitting Bearer Share incorporations. I consider entities to be closed
on the “inactivation date” the data, or right-censored at the minimum of the “struck-off date” or December 31, 2015.
I consider observations at risk from January 1, 2007 onward. The dashed blue line indicates when UBS and the US
government entered a deferred prosecution agreement. The dotted blue line depicts the start of the US Department of
Justice’s Swiss Bank Program. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals.
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The curves show that prior to the first shock, the decay rate of entities is the same regardless of
whether or not the entity has a Swiss intermediary. However, around the UBS shock roughly 4-5%
of entities with Swiss intermediaries are abruptly closed and the closure rate is higher (steeper
downward curve) for the subsequent year. From early 2011 onward, the curves again move in par-
allel until the August 2013 shock where again the closure rate for entities with Swiss intermediaries
increases relative to other entities.
To evaluate the effect formally, I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model in a difference-in-
difference style analysis:
hi(t) = h0(t) exp(α1SwissIntermediary i + α2(SwissIntermediary i × PostEvent t)) (4.5)
where i subscripts entity-investor pairs and t subscripts time (year and month). SwissIntermediary i
is an indicator if the entity-investor pair has a Swiss intermediary, and PostEvent t is an indicator
if t is after the event date. I employ two event dates: February 2009 for the UBS agreement and
August 2013 for the launch of the Department of Justice’s Swiss bank program. Columns (1) and
(2) test the first event, whereas (3) and (4) test the second.
In column (1), I use entities that were incorporated between January 1, 2001 and December
31, 2006 where the investor country is not a haven country and the entity is not set up with bearer
shares. I find no difference between entities likely using Swiss bank accounts and the control group
prior to the UBS agreement. After the agreement, the closure rate for entities with likely Swiss
bank accounts increases by 33.8%. Despite the UBS agreement only explicitly affecting US in-
vestors, it shook faith in the continued secrecy of the Swiss banking sector for investors worldwide.
In column (2), I repeat the estimation but exclude US investors, and find nearly identical results to
column (1). In column (3) I use a broader incorporation window, 2001 through 2010, but I exclude
EU investors to make sure I am not picking up an effect from the Amended EUSD. I find a 48.5%
increase in the closure rate for entities likely using Swiss banks after the Swiss bank program
launch. This result is virtually identical when I exclude US investors in column (4), ruling out
the potentially confounding influence of FATCA and reinforcing that investor beliefs about Swiss
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Table 4.6: Closures of entities with probable Swiss bank accounts. Columns (1) and (2) estimate
the model: hi(t) = h0(t) exp(α1SwissIntermediary i+α2(SwissIntermediary i×PostUBS t)). i subscripts entity-
investor pairs and t subscripts time (Month and Year). SwissIntermediary i is an indicator equaling 1 if the entity has
a Swiss intermediary, and PostUBS t is an indicator equaling 1 if t > February 2009. Columns (1) and (2) include
entities with an incorporation date from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2006; columns (3) and (4) extend this
window through December 31, 2010. Observations are at risk from January 2007 onwards for columns (1) and (2),
and from August 2011 onward for columns (3) and (4). The sample excludes instances where the investor is from a
Tax Haven Country per Gravelle (2009) and when the entity is set up with bearer shares. Columns (2) and (4) exclude
US investors; Columns (3) and (4) exclude EU Investors. I consider an entity to be closed on the “inactivation date” or
right-censored one year before the “struck-off date” or December 31, 2015, whichever is earlier. Reported coefficients
are in unexponentiated form, with exponentiated hazard ratios at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered
at the investor country level. *, **, and *** denote two-sided statisitical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SwissIntermediary 0.047 0.042 0.033 0.021
(0.173) (0.177) (0.107) (0.111)
SwissIntermediary × PostUBS 0.291∗∗ 0.287∗∗
(0.133) (0.135)
SwissIntermediary × PostSwissBankProgram 0.396∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.145)
Sample Composition
EU investors Yes Yes No No
US investors Yes No Yes No
Number of Entity-Investor Pairs 23690 23097 30569 29536
Number of Closure Events 6963 6835 10271 9904
Exponentiated Coefficients
SwissIntermediary 1.048 1.043 1.033 1.022
SwissIntermediary × PostUBS 1.338 1.332
SwissIntermediary × PostSwissBankProgram 1.485 1.490
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banks’ willingness to cooperate changed worldwide. Together these results suggest that investors
use offshore entities less when their confidence in banks’ maintaining secrecy is shaken. This find-
ing is consistent with bank cooperation increasing the probability of detection and reducing the
benefits of offshore entities as a concealment technology.14
4.3 Additional Analyses
4.3.1 Tests of Sample Representativeness
One potential threat to the validity of my inferences is the representativeness of Mossack Fon-
seca’s activity compared with other incorporation service providers. To help rule out this pos-
sibility, I exploit a new leak from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists: the
Bahamas Leaks. On September 21, 2016, the ICIJ appended the Panama Papers database with a
leaked copy of the Bahamian government’s corporate registry. The leak includes all of the offshore
entities created in the Bahamas from 1990 to the beginning of 2016, resulting in approximately
175,000 entities. In contrast to the Panama Papers which has entities created by one law firm in
many jurisdictions, the Bahamas Leaks have entities created by all service providers, but only the
entities incorporated in the Bahamas. If my results hold in the Bahamas Leaks sample, I can rule
out that Mossack Fonseca’s activity is not representative of the industry as a whole.
The basic structure of the Bahamas Leaks data is quite similar to the Panama Papers, but
there are a few key differences. Because the data source is the Bahamian government’s corporate
registry, the data contain only the information that was reported to the government by the service
provider. As a result, some of the elements in the Panama Papers are missing in the Bahamas
Leaks. Most importantly, because the Bahamian corporate registry does not maintain shareholder
lists, the Bahamas Leaks do not contain the investor identities. There is sometimes a named officer
in the data, but it is unclear if this officer is an actual investor or a nominee director, and the officer
14It is possible that the distribution of incorporation dates across the Swiss intermediary and non-Swiss intermediary
subsamples is different. For instance if entities have a consistent half life regardless of the intermediary, but the
incorporation dates of the Swiss-intermediary entities are clustered to the start of the sample, I could observe a
spurious result. To rule out the possibility, I re-estimate the four specifications but use separate strata for each year
of incorporation. This approach allows each year of incorporation to have a unique unspecified baseline hazard
function. The estimated coefficients and statistical significance are virtually identical (untabulated for brevity),
eliminating the possibility of heterogeneity in the incorporation date driving the results.
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does not have address or country information. Hence, I am unable to determine the investor’s
home country. Additionally, the “intermediaries” captured in the data are different than those in
the Panama Papers; while in the Panama Papers the intermediary is the party that interfaces with the
actual investor, an intermediary in the Bahamas Leak is the service provider that actually executed
the incorporation (e.g. Mossack Fonseca is an intermediary in the Bahamas Leaks). The Bahamas
Leaks data also do not have inactivation dates reflecting when the investor decided to dissolve the
entity. Rather, the only indication of a dissolved entity is a populated struck-off date: the date
where the government struck the entity off the corporate registry because the recurring service
fees were not paid. All of the struck off dates in the Bahamas Leaks happen in the last few days
of January or the first few days of February, suggesting that the Bahamian government conducts
annual purges at this time of the year.
Because of these data differences, I cannot replicate my tests from the Panama Papers directly
using the Bahamas Leaks data. However, I am able to conduct less powerful variants of two of
them: the increase in activity around the EUSD roll-out, and the differential closure rate when the
EU adds corporate accounts to th EUSD’s information exchange. Rather than conduct a difference-
in-difference test comparing EU investor activity to non-EU investor activity, I determine if the
overall number of new entities incorporated in the Bahamas spikes around the EUSD. Because I
am unable to pull out the non-EU investor entities, this analysis is necessarily noisier than my tests
using the Panama Papers data. I adopt a similar modification for evaluating the closure rates: I
look to see if entities created around the EUSD roll-out are more likely to close after the move to
complete information exchange than entities created before the EUSD was enacted. Again, this
test is noisy because I cannot exclude non-EU investor entities from the sample.
Nevertheless, Figure 4.6 presents the results. Panel A plots the number of new entities in the
Bahamas Leaks by incorporation month. Unlike Figure 4.1, this plot counts entities, not entity-
investor pairs. I detect the same spike around the July 1, 2005 roll-out date, suggesting that the
observed investor behavior is not specific to Mossack Fonseca.
Panel B presents survival curves analogous to Panel C of Figure 4.3. Here, the treatment
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Figure 4.6: Panama Papers representativeness. This figure uses Bahamas Leaks data to assess the rep-
resentativeness of the Panama Papers data. Panel A presents the number of new entities created in the Bahamas per
month. Panel B presents Kaplan-Meier survival curves based on incorporation date. The treatment group consist of
entities incorporated between March 1, 2005 and July 31, 2005, and the control group consists of entities incorporated
between January 1, 2001 and June 3, 2003. I use the struck-off date as the termination date and right censor entities
that are not struck off by December 31, 2015. I exclude from both the treatment and control groups entities that were
struck off prior to January 1, 2010. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals.
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group are Bahamas Leaks entities created between March 1, 2005 and July 31, 2005. The control
group are entities created between January 1, 2001 and June 3, 2003.15 Because I only observe
the annual purges, my estimate of when the investor chooses to abandon the entity is necessarily
noisy. For instance, an entity struck off in the January/February 2015 purge was presumably struck
off because the investors did not pay the 2014 registration fees to the Bahamian government. As
a result, the last fee was likely paid at some point in 2013, meaning that the investor abandoned
the entity either in 2013 after paying the fee or in 2014. Thus, the sharp drop from the treatment
group after May 2013 in Panel C of Figure 4.3, would show up in Panel B of Figure 4.6 as starting
in 2014 and accelerating in 2015. Indeed, I observe this pattern. The curves depict the survival
rates for entities in each group that have not been struck-off before January 1, 2010. I start the
at-risk period later for this analysis to allow purges to begin in the treatment group, given the lag
between investor abandonment and the struck off date. The 95% confidence intervals overlap up
to 2014, where the treatment group begins to exhibit a higher closure rate. By 2015 the confidence
intervals of the survival rates no longer overlap; the treatment group exhibits higher attrition. This
result is consistent with the pattern in Figure 4.3, suggesting that the Panama Papers data is indeed
a representative sample of investors.
4.3.2 Additional Potential Contaminating Forces
With any difference in difference analysis, contamination from concurrent events may result in
spurious inferences. In my analyses I explicitly address a number of potential threats (e.g. Offshore
Leaks disclosure, changes in amnesty programs, and the introduction of the Common Reporting
Standard). While it is impossible to completely rule out all other possibilities, I consider two of
the most probable ones here.
Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) are bilateral agreements that allow tax author-
ities to request information from tax haven governments about specific suspected evaders. While
15For this Bahamas Leaks analysis I extend this control group window a year earlier than the Panama Papers analysis
to boost power, counteracting the noisiness resulting from the inclusion of non-EU investors and the imprecision of
the closure dates.
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these agreements are weak by design, other studies have detected effects.16 The bulk of these
agreements were signed in late 2009 and 2010 just after the OECD threatened sanctions on any
haven that did not sign a minimum of 12 agreements. Thus, the timing poses a potential problem
primarily for my first Swiss bank shock. However, Switzerland signed its first TIEA in 2013, and
even then, the TIEAs were only with fellow tax havens, making it unlikely that TIEAs could be
driving my results.
The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MCAA)
builds on the TIEA concept. Championed by the OECD, this convention provides a similar mech-
anism for information exchanges as TIEAs, but has the added benefit of pertaining to a fully con-
nected network of countries as opposed to country pairs. Out of Mossack Fonseca’s major havens,
Seychelles signed in 2015, Samoa and Panama signed in 2016, and Bahamas has not signed as
of 2017. Thus, the timing of these jurisdictions’ participation could not have induced my re-
sults. In November 2013, the UK extended its ratification to cover its protectorates (including the
British Virgin Islands and Anguilla) effective March 2014. To rule out this extension driving my
strengthened EUSD or my FATCA results, I rerun these analyses excluding entities created in ei-
ther of these jurisdictions. My results are robust to this sample change (not tabulated for brevity).
Switzerland signed in October 2013, raising the possibility that the MCAA and not the US DoJ’s
Swiss Bank Program induced the 2013 increase in closures of entities with Swiss bank accounts.17
While I cannot rule out this possibility for my second shock to Swiss banking, the timing cannot
explain the increased closures around the 2009 deferred prosecution agreement.
16Johannesen and Zucman (2014), Hanlon et al. (2015) and Bennedsen and Zeume (2015) explore the effect of these
TIEAs and find results on bank deposit flows, foreign direct investment, and firm governance respectively.
17Switzerland signed the agreement on October 15, 2013, but the Swiss Parliament did not ratify it until December
2015.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The recent release of the Panama Papers brought the use of offshore entities to the forefront
of public attention. Policymakers are calling for additional tools to clamp down on tax evasion.
Thus, understanding how prior regulatory efforts affected this industry is key for making informed
policy decisions going forward. This paper provides a first-look at recently released Panama Papers
data on offshore entities and presents evidence about the effect of a series of regulatory attempts
designed to bring transparency to foreign asset ownership.
My results showcase investors attempting to hide their assets from their home governments.
Perhaps more surprising than investors’ desire to conceal is the active role played by financial
institutions in these schemes. Bank secrecy is a key ingredient to the ability of an offshore entity to
provide meaningful concealment from the tax authorities. I find that when investors lose confidence
in their bank as a supportive partner in crime, they are less likely to use offshore entities—as
evidenced by fewer incorporations and increased closures.
However, reluctant to cede their role in the lucrative offshore asset business, banks take an
active role in thwarting government efforts to promote transparency. In the case of the EUSD, I find
banks taking the lead in setting up legal structures in tax havens to circumvent disclosure of their
clients’ assets to the government. While these high-net-worth investors can hardly be considered
unwitting victims of cunning banks that push them deeper into illicit activity, my results do point
to supply-side forces driving some of the use of tax haven shell companies.
My results have policy implications. First and foremost, it appears that applying pressure to
banks is a powerful way to shape investor behavior. The large elasticities across all of the regula-
tory changes suggest that investors view the disclosure of their asset holdings to the government as
a real threat and shift their concealment behavior in response. Second, it appears that competitive
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pressures among banks is an important force on offshore asset concealment. Provided the pres-
sure applied to banks is not uniform, pressured banks will be concerned with losing market share
and will seek out ways to skirt the spirit of the regulations. These findings lend empirical support
for the theory laid out in Elsayyad and Konrad (2012), suggesting that a sequential approach to
clamping down on tax havens may be counterproductive. Third, governments with powerful finan-
cial systems can effect change even if they do not have direct legal authority over offshore banks.
While smaller governments may not have the same leverage, the spillover effects I find suggest that
bank reputation matters, raising the possibility that small countries may benefit in reduced evasion
by piggybacking on the efforts of larger economies.
While I provide robust evidence that carefully crafted exchange programs and pressure on
financial institutions to comply can be an effective deterrent to the use of offshore entities for
concealment purposes, I am unable to determine conclusively if they reduce tax evasion. Investors
may turn to other concealment technologies that are either riskier or more expensive. For instance,
investors may move investments to anonymous currencies like Bitcoin or enlist the help of even less
scrupulous financial institutions that are more willing to commit fraud on behalf of their clients.
Unfortunately, given the scope of the Panama Papers data, I am unable to test these possibilities. I
leave these questions to future research.
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